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AN APPELLATE COURT DILEMMA AND A 
SOLUTION THROUGH SUBJECT MATTER 
ORGANIZATION 
Daniel J. Meador* 
The recent litigation explosion presents a two-pronged dilemma for 
American appellate courts. If, on the one hand, the number of appellate 
judges is not expanded to keep abreast of growing case loads, there 
is a risk that courts will rely too heavily on professional staff, thereby 
watering down the decision-making process. If, on the other hand, 
the number of judges is proportionately increased with the growth in 
appellate litigation, the number of three-judge decisional units will also 
increase, thereby threatening predictability and uniformity in the law 
of the jurisdiction. This Article undertakes to explain that dilemma 
and to offer a solution for it. 
I. THE DILEMMA 
A. Undue Reliance on Professional Staff Assistance 
The introduction of central staff attorneys was a major innovation 
in American appellate courts in the late 1960's and early 1970's. Central 
staff attorneys were viewed at that time as an emergency measure to 
equip appellate courts to cope with rapidly swelling dockets. They proved 
effective in that regard, and, in the process, proved their value in other 
respects. The majority of state and federal appellate courts now have 
central staffs, and this form of professional assistance appears to be 
a valuable and permanent part of the American judicial scene. Staff 
attorneys have various duties including screening, research, memoran-
dum writing, and order and opinion drafting. It is difficult now to 
imagine a high .volume appellate court without a central legal staff 
engaged in some or all of these functions. 1 
• James Monroe Professor of Law, University of Virginia. B.S., 1949, Auburn University; 
J.D., 1951, University of Alabama; LL.M., 1954, Harvard University. 
1. For a discussion of the history and contemporary usage of central staff attorneys, see 
D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS: STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME 7-18, 31-125 
(1974) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE COURTS); J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, LAW CLERKS AND 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1980); Cameron, The Central Staff· A New Solution to an Old Problem, 
23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 465 (1976); Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience 
of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 937 (1980). 
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From the beginning of the use of central staffs, however, there has 
been unease about the risk of delegation of judicial authority. One 
purpose of the Appellate Justice Project, sponsored by the National 
Center for State Courts in the early 1970's, was to identify the ap-
propriate line between proper staff work and the core of nondelegable 
judicial responsibility. 2 Experience over the last· decade has suggested 
that numerous aspects of judicial work can be delegated to either law 
clerks or staff attorneys as long as the judges continue to employ their 
own thought processes to reach their own conclusions. The appropriate 
line is difficult to draw and it is even more difficult to enforce. Ultimate-
ly, everything depends on each judge's good faith and conscientious 
devotion to the judicial task. 
A continually rising caseload, however, puts pressure on even the 
best intentioned judges. Furthermore, as the volume of cases and number 
of professional assistants (including law clerks and staff attorneys) in-
creases, so does the threat of undue delegation of judicial responsibilities. 
Early apprehensions tended to be drowned out by the overwhelming 
need for additional assistants to cope with the cases. More recently, 
apprehensions have resurfaced as both the size of central staffs and 
the number of law clerks have continued to grow. In the eighteen-
judge Michigan Court of Appeals, for example, there are thirty-five 
attorneys on the central staff and six additional attorneys who work 
on motions; in addition, each judge has two law clerks. 3 In the twenty-
three-judge Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit there are thirty 
central staff attorneys and three law clerks per judge. 4 Judges and com-
mentators alike are becoming increasingly concerned about what is 
labeled the judicial "bureaucracy" or the "bureaucratization" of the 
judiciary. 5 Fears are voiced that appellate courts, with this "hidden 
judiciary," eventually will come to resemble administrative agencies, 
where a body of five or seven members sits atop a pyramid of dozens 
or even hundreds of staff who do the work and pass it up for review 
and approval. In such a setting the agency members do not work in 
the way that has been traditionally associated with appellate judges. 
Along with the threat of undue delegation of judicial authority is 
the threat of erosion of the judicial process. If an appellate court places 
2. See APPELLATE COURTS, supra note I, at 126-37. 
3. Speech by R. Danhof, Central Staff in the Michigan Court of Appeals, at the Regional 
Seminar of the National Committee of Appellate Court Staff Counsel, Chicago, Ill. (October 
28, 1982). 
4. J. OAKLEY & R. THOMPSON, supra note I, at 92, 153-54. 
5. See Bird, The Hidden Judiciary, 11 JUDGES' J., Winter 1980, at 4; Higginbotham, Bu-
reaucracy: The Carcinoma of the Federal Judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261 (1980); Hoffman, The 
Bureaucratic Spectre: Newest Challenge to the Courts, 66 JUDICATURE 60 (1982); McCree, 
Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777 (1981); Rubin, Bureaucratiza-
tion of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 
648 (1980). 
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too much work in the hands of staff when the judges are overburdened 
with cases, there is a high risk that the deliberative process will beome 
unduly truncated. The likelihood grows that each judge will not be 
digesting the record, the pertinent legal authorities, and the arguments 
of counsel, independently reasoning his way to a decision. Paradox-
ically, the amount of assistance given to judges increases the threat 
of erosion of their judicial responsibility. 
To minimize this risk, the authors of Justice On Appeal recommended 
limiting staff size to a three-to-one ratio. 6 Pursuant to this recommen-
dation the total number of professional assistants on an appellate court 
- including law clerks and central staff - should not number more 
than three times the number of judges on the court. For example, on 
a court of twelve appellate judges, law clerks and central staff could 
not exceed thirty-six. The theory behind this formula is that judicial 
work cannot be delegared if there is no one to whom it may be delegated. 
The authors concluded that the number of judgeships on the court 
should be increased if an appellate court having the recommended 
maximum level of professional assistance cannot keep abreast of its 
work and render decisions within a reasonable time and with requisite 
deliberateness of process. In s.hort, an increase in the number of 
judgeships coupled with a limitation on staff size is an effective way 
to guard against undue reliance on staff and to assure preservation 
of the deliberative judicial process. Adding judgeships, however, presents 
another threat to the law, which brings us to the other horn of the 
dilemma. 
B. The Roulette Game and the Tower of Babel Effect 
One suggested formula for adding judges to appellate courts is that 
a state appellate judge sitting on a three-judge panel should participate 
in no more than 300 dispositions on the merits annually; in other words, 
when the number of dispositions exceeds 100 per judgeship, the court 
needs more judges. 7 A judge on a federal Court of Appeals should 
not participate in more than seventy-five dispositions on the merits 
annually. In many state and federal jurisdictions judges already par-
ticipate in more dispositions than this formula recommends. 
One reason for legislative reluctance to add judgeships is that creating 
a new judgeship is expensive; it costs far more than adding a law clerk 
or staff attorney. Another reason is the apprehension that as the number 
of appellate judges on any given court increases, predictability and 
uniformity in the law are threatened. There are also apprehensions about 
6. P. CARRINGTON, 0. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 48 (1976) [hereinafter 
cited as JUSTICE ON APPEAL]. 
7. Id. at 142-46, 196. 
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unmanageability and the loss of collegiality. These apprehensions are 
well founded in light of the way American intermediate appellate courts 
are organized. In appellate courts, judges typically sit in three-judge 
panels, and cases are randomly distributed among all panels. In most 
courts membership in the panel is constantly shuffled. Thus, there is 
no stability in the decisional unit and little continuity in its adjudications. 
A court of nine or fewer judges is relatively free of such concerns 
and problems. Perhaps even a court of twelve judges presents no dif-
ficulties. When a court reaches fifteen or more judges, however, prob-
lems begin to arise. Although some judges on the Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit strongly resisted a division of that circuit when 
the number of its judges was increased to twenty-six, sentiment quickly 
jelled for division. Such a court is too large to sit effectively en bane, 
and its sitting in constantly rotating three-judge panels converts the 
appellate process into a roulette game under which no one can know 
the identity of the judges who will decide an appeal. Moreover, what 
should be a single voice of the law - the one appellate court - becomes 
a judicial Tower of Babel, a court speaking through multiple voices. 8 
In an appellate court of fifteen judges there are 455 possible com-
binations of three. In a court of twenty-three judges there are 1,740 
possible threesomes. Given the kinds of varying jurisprudential ap-
proaches found among American appellate judges, the losing litigant 
in any case may reasonably believe that an appeal has at least some 
chance of success; because the three-judge panel that will decide the 
appeal is not known in advance, and because the losing litigant needs 
only two judges, there is always some possibility of his winning. The 
incentive is strong for the loser to spin the roulette wheel with the hope 
that the ball will drop into the threesome where there are two judges 
favorable to that side of the matter. This type of appellate organiza-
tion creates an artificial incentive to appeal, which, in turn, may have 
much to do with the disproportionate growth of appeals compared with 
that of trial court dispositions. 
In addition to introducing an element of gambling into the appellate 
process, a large number of panels at the same appellate level 
simultaneously deciding the same types of issues produce a cacophony 
of voices. Ideally, an appellate court would enunciate the law of the 
jurisdiction with a single voice and would apply the law uniformly to 
all matters coming before it. The more numerous its three-judge panels 
the less likely it is that an appellate court can approach that ideal. 
Moreover, the larger the appellate court grows, the more unwieldy the 
8. The metaphor is, of course, derived from Genesis 11 :4--9. It was first used in connection 
with contemporary appellate problems in Hazard, After the Trial - The Realities of Appellate 
Review, in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 60, 81 (H. Jones ed. 1965). 
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en bane procedure becomes and hence the less likely is its use. Indeed, 
some state intermediate appellate courts have no provisions at all for 
en bane procedure. The court of last resort, typically having from five 
to nine judges, becomes increasingly unable to control the multiple 
panels' adjudications at the intermediate leveL The result is the Tower 
of Babel effect, rendering law unpredictable and lacking in uniformity. 
II. SUBJECT MATTER ORGANIZATION AS A SOLUTION 
A. The Concept of Subject Matter Organization 
As caseloads continue to grow, the dilemma increasingly confronting 
American intermediate appellate courts is this: if the number of judges 
remains relatively small, there is the ever-rising threat of undue delega-
tion to staff and of dilution of the judicial process; conversely, if the 
number of judges increases to keep abreast of the caseload volume, 
and if the courts continue to sit in random panels deciding all types 
of cases, the law will progressively lose its predictability and jurisdiction-
wide uniformity. The solution to this dilemma for a large intermediate 
appellate court is the adoption of a subject matter plan of internal 
organization. This method of appellate organization eliminates random 
assignments of judges and cases and permits the court to be enlarged 
to the size needed to cope with the increased quantity of cases, thus 
avoiding undue delegation to staff while simultaneously maintaining 
doctrinal coherence in the law. 
"Subject matter organization" is a form of internal organization 
in an appellate court whereby relatively stable panels or divisions of 
from three to five judges are assigned specified portions of the court's 
docket; the portions of the docket assigned to each panel are exclusively 
assigned to that panel. Each type of case goes on appeal from the trial 
court to a specified panel or division and to no other. Thus, whatever 
the type of case, the lawyers, litigants, and trial judge know from the 
outset of litigation in the trial court the precise judges who will decide 
any appeal that may result. Although stable, the panels are not 
permanent; they gradually shift through staggered rotation. 9 
Although novel to Americans, appellate subject matter organization 
has been used for many years in Europe. One of the best working 
examples can be found in the Federal Republic of Germany. 10 German 
9. The subject matter method of appellate organization was suggested in JusncE ON APPEAL, 
supra note 6, at 174-84, 204-07. 
10. For a description of the German appellate courts and their internal organization, see 
Meador, Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design from an American Perspec-
tive, S HASTINGS lNT'L & COMP. L. REv. 27, 37 (1981) [hereinafter cited as German Design). 
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appellate courts are extraordinarily large by American standards; the 
nineteen intermediate appellate courts range in size from 17 to 152 
judges. The average size of these regional appellate courts is seventy-
two. An appellate court of this size operating in the traditional American 
fashion would probably make a shambles of the law; chaos in legal 
doctrine would almost certainly result if a court of that size sat in ever-
shifting panels, deciding randomly assigned cases. Yet for decades these 
German courts, with their hosts of judges, have functioned effectively 
and maintained a high degree of uniformity in the law through a sub-
ject matter plan of organization. 
This method of internal organization is also employed in Germany 
in the highest court for ordinary civil and criminal cases, the 
Bundesgerichtshof (often referred to as the Federal Supreme Court). 
That court has 110 judges and is organized into eleven civil divisions; 
in addition, there are several criminal divisions and special divisions. 
Each division consists of seven judges. 
Each civil division is assigned several categories of cases, and those 
types of cases are decided only by that one division. For example, Civil 
Division III is assigned cases involving water rights, mineral rights, 
loans and debts, aircraft noise, certain employment disputes, specified 
arbitration agreements, cases arising under the Convention on Human 
Rights, and several other types of cases. 11 The docket assignments for 
each division are stated precisely in a printed document known as the 
"work distribution plan," which also lists the judges assigned to each 
division. The plan is revised annually and is available to the public. 12 
Thus, in any type of lawsuit the lawyers and litigants will know from 
the outset the appellate judges they will face if they appeal. 
The subject matter plan is administered in Germany in a way that 
prevents most appellate judges from being "specialists." This is achieved 
by assigning to each division a mixture of types of cases so that the 
division is not exclusively focused on one category of case or one kind 
of legal issue. The judges of Civil Division III, for example, although 
responsible for only a small portion of the court's total business, deal 
with a rich variety of legal questions. The categories of cases assigned 
to that division involve questions of tort law, property law, contract 
law, and international law. Thus, the German system reaps the 
advantages of predictability and uniformity while avoiding the 
undesirable features of narrow specialization. 
In the United States there are three examples of subject matter 
organization in the federal appellate courts. For many years the Court 
11. Id. at 62-64. 
12. The full text of the docket assignments in the work distribution plan for the 
Bundesgerichtshof, translated into English, is set out in id. at 59-72. 
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit maintained an "oil and gas" panel, 
consisting of several judges of the court to whom all appeals involving 
oil and gas law were assigned; such cases were assigned to no other 
judges on the court. The judges who sat on the oil and gas panel also 
sat on other cases. All appeals from federal district courts in cases 
arising under certain energy laws go to a specified group of judges 
who constitute the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals. 13 They 
are the only judges deciding those cases, but they also sit on other 
cases. All appeals from the federal district courts in cases arising under 
the patent laws now go to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit; 
the judges on that court also decide numerous other categories of cases. 14 
In each of these instances there is a single appellate forum of known 
and stable membership, composed of judges who are not specialized. 
Because the idea of comprehensive subject matter organization in 
appellate courts is unfamiliar to Americans, an effort is made in the 
appendix to present such a plan for two courts. One is a state in-
termediate appellate court, the appellate division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court; the other is a federal intermediate appellate court, the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. These two courts were selected 
for this exercise because they maintain statistical data in relation to 
categories of cases. 15 Although a subject matter organization plan re-
quires more refined data, these courts maintain more detailed data than 
is generally employed for statistical purposes in American appellate 
courts. Indeed, the absence of data on appellate case types is a serious 
obstacle to designing a plan for subject matter organization. This 
obstacle can be readily overcome, however, by encouraging appellate 
courts to maintain case filing information on such a basis. 
The charts in the appendix illustrate variations in panel size, judge 
rotation, and docket assignments. The Ninth Circuit plan presupposes 
a court of twenty-five judges sitting in divisions of five. 16 The New 
13. Economic Stabilization Act Amendment of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, § 211, 85 Stat. 
748-50. 
14. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37 
(to be codified at 28 U.S.C. 1295). 
15. Data for the New Jersey Appellate Division were derived from figures provided by the 
Office of the Clerk, Appellate Division of the Superior Court. Data for the Ninth Circuit were 
derived from statistics provided by the Office of the Circuit Executive. 
The Administrative Office of the United States Courts maintains data on more limited categories 
of cases for appeals in the federal circuits. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, 
Federal Judicial Workload Statistics A-2-A-3 (March 31, I 982). 
16. The Ninth Circuit is presently authorized 23 judgeships. Additional judgeships, however, 
have been requested, and, given the likelihood of continued caseload growth, it is probable that 
the court will grow to 25 or more judges. 
Present law requires the courts of appeals to sit in three-judge panels. 28 U.S.C. § 46(b)-(c) 
(West Supp. 1982). The statute creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit authorizes 
that court to sit in panels of more than three judges. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 103, 96 Stat. 25, 25 (amending 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (West Supp. 1982)). The 
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Jersey plan takes the appellate division's actual number of twenty-one 
judges and existing seven ·"Parts" as the basis for the plan. Under 
the Ninth Circuit plan eac_h judge serves a five-year assignment in a 
division before rotating to another. Under the New Jersey plan, each 
judge serves a three-year assignment in a Part befor~ rotating. Othe_r 
variations, of course, could be adopted; these are offered simply to 
provide specific examples of two types of judicial rot_aJion .plans in 
the context of two distinctive court systems. 
Ideally, the docket assignments to the court's various .djvisions would 
be based on a more detailed br~akflown of ~ase types. In the Ninth 
Circuit plan, the category .of ''gener.aJ civil'' is ,distributed among three 
divisions; iii practice, that category wotJld need to .be broken down 
into the various types of general civil cases an.d distributed on some 
rational basis among these three divisions so that no type of case would 
be dealt with by more than one divjsion. Tbe data .are ~ufficient, 
however, to provide a concrete illus.tration of how a subject .matter 
organization plan could be installed in an American .appellate court. 
In allocating cases among t)J.e various divisions the plan should not 
confine any single division to a relatively narrow category of legal subject 
matter. Variety can be achieved in different ways. for example, a diyi-
sion could be assigned a group of wholly unrelated types of cases. 
Illustrations of this can be seen in the two plans jn the Appendix. On 
the other hand, a division could be assigned a group qf cases that c;tre 
kindred in some way or at least not in alien fields. For example, in 
the New Jersey plan, Part (B) is assigned cases dealing with marriage 
and with juveniles, an area that can be defined as family law; in addi-
tion, it is assigned appeals from agencies iQ. the fields of education, 
health, and corrections. Although the latter are not considered family 
law, they are not altogether unr~lated to 0,-at field. 
It is important that the actual workload of e_ach _division be roughly 
the same. W orklo_ad cannot be arrived at simply by counting the number 
of cases; some types of cases are more complex and time-consuming 
than others. Thus, a c;:1se-weighting system woulq b!! usef4J in arriving 
at a sound subject matter plan. 11 
Criminal cases present a special problem~ They can be allocateq. among 
the divisions of the court in two basic ways. One is to distribute the 
criminal business throughout all divisiops of tne court so that every 
appellate juqge sits on some crirp.inc;tl cases. One argument for that 
arrangeme:qt js that because criminal justice js a pervasive concern to 
society and has such emotional ;iq_q poljtjcal ramifications all judges 
desirability of five-judge panels is disc4ssed in JusncE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 159-~. 
17. For a description of the case-wejgllting syste111 devisep in the Ninth Cim1it _as a 111.eans 
of distributing workloads evenly among the various pimels, see Hellman, suprµ note I, at 96;2-64. 
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of the court should be responsible for regular participation in that 
business. Also, under that plan of distribution no judges at any time 
would have unduly large or exclusive concern with criminal appeals. 
This arrangement is illustrated in the New Jersey plan. 
The other arrangement, illustrated in the Ninth Circuit plan, is the 
allocation of all criminal appeals to a single division. This maximizes 
the advantage of the subject matter plan of organization by assuring 
the highest degree of uniformity of decisions on criminal law questions. 
If the volume of criminal appeals is too large for any orte division, 
two or more divisions may be employed, but that arrangement begins 
to dilute the advantages of the subject matter plan. 
Even if criminal appeal business is distributed to more than one divi-
sion of the courf, some rational allocations can be made to maximize 
uniformity and efficiency. For example, like offenses can be grouped; 
all homicide offenses can be assigned to one division, all property 
offenses to another, arid so on. Another way of allocating criminal 
business to more than one division is by source of appeals, with each 
division of the court handling all appeals from specified trial courts 
or geographical regions. This method is used in the German appellate 
courts. 18 Under any scheme for assigning criminal appeals, post-
conviction review cases should be classified- as· criminal. 
The advantage of five-judge divisions over three-judge divisions is 
stability in the appellate forum, which in turn heightens predictability 
and uniformity in the law. If, as in the Ninth Circuit plan, a division 
consisted of five judges, with only one departing each year, there would 
be greater continuity of membership than in divisions of three, as in 
the New Jersey plan. In other words, an annual one-fifth rotation is 
much less destabilizing than: an annual one-third rotation. Both plans, 
however, can be employed to achieve the benefits of subject matter 
organization and they would be preferable to the traditional American 
system of random and ever-fluctuating assignments. 
As a practical matter, the division size is closely related to the term 
each judge is assigned to a particular division. It would simply be more 
workable to have a three-year assignment on a three-judge panel and 
a ·five-year assignment on a five-judge panel than it would be to have 
assignments of some other duration. Even here there is room for vari-
ation consistent with the subject matter concept of appellate 
organization. 
The illustrative plans for the Ninth Circuit and the New Jersey 
Appellate Division show the assignments of the judges to the various 
divisions, with subsequent rotations through six- and ten-year periods 
18. German Design, supra note 10, at 46. 
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respectively. 19 When any appellate court adopts a subject matter plan 
of organization there will be an initial transitional period during which 
judges will rotate more frequently than they will in the long run. This 
is necessary to set in motion a long-range plan of staggered rotation. 
Rotations too frequent would undermine stability - a major purpose 
of the plan. Once the start-up period has passed, the regular pace of 
rotation can set in on either a five-year basis (as in the Ninth Circuit 
plan) or on a three-year basis (as in the New Jersey Appellate Division 
plan). 
Although these plans show the assignments of all judges of the court 
through the first two complete rotations, it is unlikely, as a practical 
matter, that all judges now sitting on those two courts will be on the 
court through the entire period and there will be no new judge joining 
the court. Changes will undoubtedly occur in any appellate court through 
death, retirement, and resignation. When a vacancy occurs, the new 
judge must be fitted into the scheme by being either put into the shoes 
of the judge he replaces or assigned to some other divison, with ad-
justment there to make room for him. The plans shown in the appendix 
simply illustrate how any given judge would progress during the first 
two complete rotations, if he remained on the court. 
If the docket assignments are carefully made and the categories of 
cases are described with sufficient precision, the plan should be easy 
to administer. In the German appellate courts, for example, there is 
an experienced administrative official who reviews each case as it is 
filed and routes it to the appropriate division. The plan describes the 
cases with sufficient clarity to enable this official to identify each case 
type. In the occasional instance where a case is misdirected it is 
dispatched by the division receiving it to the appropriate division. 20 
A similar arrangement would be workable in American appellate courts. 
A staff attorney, for example, could screen the cases (much as staff 
attorneys already do in many courts) and route the cases to the 
appropriate divisions. 21 The docket allocations under a subject matter 
plan should in no sense be considered jurisdictional; they are simply 
internal administrative arrangements. No litigant should have any right 
to litigate over the appropriate division to which the case should be 
assigned. 
19. Tables 2 and 5 in the appendix show the progression of each judge. Tables 3 and 6 show 
the composition of each division through those initial rotational cycles. 
20. For a description of this administrative system in the German appellate courts, see German 
Design, supra note 10, at 48-49. 
21. For descriptions of screening by staff attorneys in American appellate courts, see JUSTICE 
ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 48-51; APPELLATE CouR TS, supra note I, at 31-40; Cameron, supra 
note I, at 470-71; Dahlen, Supreme Court Rule 24: Appellate Court Research Departments, 69 
ILL. B.J. 766-71 (1981); Hehman, Judicial Administration in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit: Organization and Procedures to Address the Volume Crisis, 10 
U. ToL. L. REv. 645, 651-56 (1979); Hellman, supra note I, at 944, 957-64. 
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The central staff attorneys in an appellate court that has adopted 
a plan of subject matter organization could be organized on the same 
subject matter basis. Each division of the court would then have 
specified staff attorneys working on its cases. This should heighten 
efficiency among the staff attorneys and also provide better working 
relationships between the judges and the support staff. Indeed, the Ninth 
Circuit central staff is already organized on a subject matter basis. 22 
It would be a short step for the court's cases to be assigned in the 
same groupings to stabilized panels of judges, the staff subject matter 
organization thereby being taken to the level of the judges. 
B. Advantages of Subject Matter Organization 
There are three advantages to subject matter organization in American 
appellate courts. The first of these is uniformity, evenhandedness, and 
stability in the law. These goals can be achieved through a relatively 
fixed group of identifiable judges who would take all appeals of a 
specific type. On any question of law and within any category of case, 
the appellate court would speak with a single voice, thereby avoiding 
the Tower of Babel effect produced by large appellate courts operating 
under random assignment procedures. 
The second advantage to subject matter organization is the ability 
to preserve judicial authority and avoid undue delegation. The plan 
achieves these objectives by permitting substantial increases in the 
numbers of appellate judges without threatening the uniformity of the 
law; such increases in judgeships would obviate the necessity for 
assembling an ever-growing number of central staff attorneys and law 
clerks. All modern appellate courts need professional assistance of this 
sort; the threat comes when the size of the professional staff becomes 
disproportionately large in relation to the number of judges on the 
court. Before that point is reached, new judgeships should be created. 
The subject matter plan of organization makes that possible without 
undermining the coherence of the jurisprudence or the collegiality among 
the judges. 
The third advantage to subject matter organization is the expedition 
and soundness of decisions. These objectives are achieved under the 
plan by narrowing the range of matters with which any one judge must 
cope from day to day. Although not confined to a single category of 
case, each judge deals with a span of legal problems that is narrower 
than the entire range of the court's docket. During any three- to five-
22. The subject matter division of work among the central staff in the Ninth Circuit was 
patterned on a proposed plan of subject matter organization for a hypothetical federal court 
of appeals set out in JusncE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 178-80. See Hellman, supra note 
I, at 947-48. 
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year period a judge might come in contact with roughly one-fifth of 
the categories of cases with which the court as a whole must deal. This 
system improves decision making because each judge can achieve a 
higher level of expertise on the subjects with which he is regularly dealing 
during the three- to five-year assignment. 
C. Arguments Against the Plan 
There are basically two arguments against the appellate subj.ect mat-
ter plan. One is rooted in the spectre and mythology of "specializa-
tion." The other is rooted in concerns that judges will become bored 
and will lack intellectual challenge. A properly designed plan of sub-
ject matter organization can avoid the force of these objections. 
The "specialization" argument is largely derived from a misunder-
standing about the subject matter method of organization. A properly 
designed plan does not set up a system of specialization, and it does 
not make specialists out of appellate judges. A contemporary dictionary 
defines a "specialist" as "one who devotes himself to one subject or 
to one particular branch of a subject or pursuit." 23 A properly designed 
subject matter plan of appellate organization will not force appellate 
judges into a single category of case or single type of legal issue. The 
German experience illustrates how docket assignments providing a mix-
ture of legal questions and case subjects can be given to a particular 
division of the court while allocating to the division only a small portion 
of the court's total docket. 
The proposed plans for the Ninth Circuit and the New Jersey 
Appellate Division also provide examples of subject matter diversity. 
Under the Ninth Circuit plan, for example, Division Three would have 
responsibility for deciding appeals in a third of the general civil cases 
and appeals from the Immigration and Naturalization Service,. the Tax 
Court, and the Bankruptcy Court. Under the New Jersey plan, Part 
F, for example, would decide cases involving real property, wills and 
estates, and condemnation; appeals from the Departments of Insurance 
and Banking; one-seventh of the criminal docket; and, a portion of 
the cases from the "miscellaneous" category. It would do violence to 
the concept of specialization to apply it to any of these clusters of 
docket assignments. A judge can remain very much a "generalist" and 
yet not simultaneously sit over every type of issue and case that can 
come before the court. 
Americans generally dislike the idea of "specialist" judges and 
"specialized" courts for three reasons. 24 One reason is that a truly 
23. RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 1261 (rev. ed. 1980). 
24. These objections are discussed in JusncE ON APPEAL, supra note 6, at 168-72; H. FRIEND· 
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specialized court - one limited to a specific, relatively narrow subject 
- is vulnerable to being captured by special interests in that field. 
The judicial selection process for such a court is apt to become a sharply 
focused target of intense lobbying efforts by interest groups having· 
a direct stake in the field; there is also a danger of politicizing the 
selection process in an undesirable way. Another criticism of true 
specialization is that judges confined to such a nan:ow range of judicial 
work may tend to develop arcane views of the law, to lose sight of 
broader considerations and values that should· infuse all judicial decision 
making, and,. in general, become less, wise and balanced in their 
judgments. The third reason is the- fear that judges so limited in their 
work will lack the status traditionally accorded- the judicial office; 
diminished status will in turn result in an inability to attract able lawyers 
to the bench. 
A properly designed plan of subject matter organization can avoid 
these problems. Under such a plan no· judge i's initially selected for 
the· court with a view toward his sitting on par:ticular types of cases. 
Nothing would be· changed in relation to judicfal selection. A judge 
would be· chosen to sit on the court for all purposes, just as. judges· 
are· now chosen for appellate courts. Only after assuming his seat on 
the court would a judge begin the assignment pattern .. Because he would 
be periodically rotated, he would not sit on the same· group of cases 
throughout his career .. Thus,. the risks- of ''capture'' and of politicizing 
the· selection process are: not intensified. 
The· danger of developing arcane, overly narrow views of the law 
- or: ''slit vision.'' - is obviated by the subject matter plan in two· 
ways-. One is that the allocation- of cases among the various divisions, 
could assure a varied mixture of questions and case·types. No appellate 
judge would· be confined' to any one category of case or any one kind 
of tegal issue. Second,. whatever the cluster of cases a Judge sits on 
for a period of three to five years, at the end of the period he will 
rotate to an entirely different cluster of cases. Thus, in aj,udicial career 
of ten to twenty years an appellate judge will hear cases concerning 
the entire range of the court's docket. A well-admini'stered subject matter 
plan provides no basis for apprehensions· about the development of 
judicial views that ignore the general values and considerations 
permeating Anglo-American jurisprudence. 
Apprehensions concerning boredom and lack of. intellectual challenge 
appear misplaced. This is true: for the reasons that will prevent specializa-
tion of judges. The assignments of any division of the court are diverse 
LY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 153-96 (1973); Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review 
of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for an Optimum Forum, 75 CoLUM. L. REV. I, 68-74 
(1975); Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 745 (1981). 
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enough to prevent boredom. In addition, a judge will not be perma-
nently assigned to the same group of cases. A court can pick its own 
period; it can be three, four, or five years. The period of assignment 
should be long enough to assure continuity and stability in the decision-
making unit; a period of less than three years seems too short to pro-
vide adequate assurance of this. On the other hand, a period longer 
than five years would heighten the risk of boredom. Thus somewhere 
between• three and five years seems optimum as the rotational cycle 
for each judge. 
The plan used in the Arizona Court of Appeals in workers' com-
pensation cases is not a good example of the kind of subject matter 
organization discussed here. In that court, one three-judge panel is 
assigned all appeals in workers' compensation cases, and those cases con-
stitute almost all the business of that panel. That arrangement results 
in something close to a truly specialized forum. Judges who have sat 
on the panel for periods of one year each are said to have found the 
work to be dull and lacking in variety. These pitfalls are avoided by 
the docket assignments and rotational schedules proposed in the Ninth 
Circuit and New Jersey plans. 
CONCLUSION 
The great benefit of appellate subject matter organization is that 
it assures that in any jurisdktion there will be only one appellate voice 
speaking on any given area of the law. In each of the federal circuits, 
for example, there would be one group of appellate judges deciding 
a given type of federal appeal. Under the existing organizational scheme 
there are dozens of different appellate entities in each circuit deciding 
each category of case. This extraordinary multitude of appellate voices 
would be reduced to one in each federal circuit. In a state such as 
New Jersey, for example, instead of seven Parts delivering decisions 
on the same legal questions, there would be only one such Part deciding 
each type of question. 
Although states having a single statewide intermediate appellate court 
can derive maximum benefit from subject matter organization, states 
whose intermediate courts are divided geographically can also benefit 
from the arrangement. In California, for example, where there are five 
appellate districts, each having its own court of appeal, the organiza-
tion of each such court by subject matter would lead to a single ap-
pellate voice in each district. A realization of the benefits to be derived 
from statewide subject matter organization might lead some states to 
abolish geographical districting. Organizing California's fifty-eight in-
termediate appellate judges on a statewide subject matter basis would 
heighten predictability and uniformity in the law, promote efficiency 
SPRING 1983] Subject Matter Organization 485 
in appellate litigation, and enable the state supreme court to monitor 
the law more effectively. The same would be true in other large states 
divided territorially at the intermediate appellate level, such as New 
York and Ohio. 
In the federal judiciary, subject matter organization may be the only 
way to prevent continuous circuit-splitting. Up to now circuit-splitting 
has been seen as the only way to maintain coherence in the law of 
the circuit and to preserve collegiality among the judges. Under a sub-
ject matter plan these qualities would be preserved even if the circuit 
grew to thirty or forty judges or more. Indeed, appreciation of the 
values of subject matter organization could lead to consolidation and 
reduction in the number of circuits, thereby assuring an even larger 
measure of uniformity in federal appellate decisions. 
As American jurisdictions continue to face pressure to add more 
judges at the intermediate appellate level, the subject matter plan of 
organization may become increasingly attractive. Eventually, it may 
be seen as the only way, in a large jurisdiction, to maintain uniformity 
and collegiality while providing the court with the number of judges 
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Office of the Clerk, Appellate Division of the Superior Court. The figures used show cases decided 
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during the 1980 court year. Statistics on filings in the Appellate Division are not shown by 
subject matter. 
2. The "Miscellaneous" category consists of 546 cases. It is divided in this table among three 
Parts, If the court adopted a subject matter plan, this category should be divided more precisely 
on the basis of more refined data. 
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Part G Contempt 2 
Counsel Fees 14 
Navigation Offenses 1 
Waterfront Commission of N. Y. Harbor 1 
Other Agency 5 
Department of Treasury 9 
Division of Tax Appeals 47 
Division of Pensions 23 
Other Non-Criminal 21 
Criminal 225 
Miscellaneous 2 170 
TOTAL 518 
OVERALL TOT AL 3738 
Table 2 
Appellate Division, Superior Court of New Jersey 
21 Judges, 7 Parts 
Rotation Plan at Three-Year Intervals 
Judge Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 
A A A A B B B 
B A A G G G D 
C A F F F E E 
D B B B C C C 
E B B E E E A 
F B D D D G G 
G C C C D D D 
H C C B B B E 
I C A A A F F 
J D D D E E E 
K D D F F F C 
L D B B B A A 
M E E E F F F 
N E E D D D G 
0 E C C C B B 
p F F F G G G 
Q F F A A A B 
R F G G G C C 
s G G G A A A 
T G G C C C F 
u G E E E D D 
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Table 3 
Appellate Division, Superior Court of New Jersey 
21 Judges, 7 Parts 
Composition of Parts (based on assignment of judges in Table 2) 
Part Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 Year6 
A ABC ABI AIQ IQS QSL SLE 
B DEF DEL DLH LHA HAO OAQ 
C GHI GHO GOT OTD TDR DRK 
D JKL JKF JFN FNG NGU GUB 
E MNO MNU MUE UEJ EJC JCH 
F PQR PQC PCK CKM KMI MIT 
G STU STR SRB RBP BPF PFN 
Table 4 
U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 3 
Subject Matter Organization of Docket 
Division 1 Criminal 811 
Federal Post Conviction 29 
TOTAL 840 
Division 2 State Habeas Corpus 96 
½ General Civil4 526 
Writ 215 
TOTAL 837 
Division 3 ½ General Civil4 526 
Immigration & Naturalization Service 193 
Bankruptcy Court 65 
Tax Court 76 
TOTAL 860 
Division 4 ½ General Civil4 526 
National Labor Relations Board 182 
Other Agency 193 
TOTAL 901 
3. Data for the Ninth Circuit were derived from statistics provided by the Office of the Circuit 
Executive. The statistics show filings for the period July I, 1980-June 30, 1981. 
4. The category of "General Civil" should be broken down into more precise categories to 
avoid duplicating work among the three divisions to which it is assigned. More refined data, 
however, are not presently available. 
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Division 5 Civil Rights Cases 
Civil Cases in Which U.S. Government 








U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit VJ 
-0 
Rotation Plan at Five-Year Intervals (Using Divisions numbered 1-5) ,, 
z 
Judge Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 C') 
A 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 '° B 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 5 4 00 w 
C 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
D 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 
E 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 
F 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 VJ 
G 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 5 C: er 
H 2 2 2 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 ...... (1) 
(") 
I 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 
.... 
s: J 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 .., Sil 
Ill .... K 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 .... O" (1) 
<ii" ... L 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 





N 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 ::s N. 
0 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 Sil .... 
p 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 s· ::s 
Q 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 
R 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 
s 4 4 1 1 1 1 5 5 5 5 
T 4 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 
u 5 5 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 
V 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 3 
w 5 5 5 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 







U.S. Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 
Composition of Divisions (Based on assignment of judges in Table 5) 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10 
ABCDE ACBDY ABCYS ABYSM AYSMG YSMGU SMGUT MGUTX GUTXR UTXRL 
FGHIJ FGHIE FGHEX FGEXR FEXRL EXRLA XRLAY RLAYD LAYDW AYDWQ 
KLMNO KLMNJ KLMJD KLJDW KLDWQ JDWQF DWQFO WQFOI QFOIC FIOCV 
PQRST PQRSO PQROI PQOIC POICV OICVK ICVKJ CVKJN VKJNH KJNHB 
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